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We suggest a parsimonious dynamic agency model in which workers have status concerns. 
A firm is a promotion hierarchy in which a worker’s status depends on past performance. We 
investigate the optimality of two types of promotion hierarchies: (i) internal labor markets, in 
which agents have a job guarantee, and (ii) “up-or-out”, in which agents are fired when 
unsuccessful. We show that up-or-out is optimal if success is difficult to achieve. When 
success is less hard to achieve, an internal labor market is optimal provided the payoffs 
associated with success are moderate. Otherwise, up-or-out is, again, optimal. These results 
are in line with observations from academia, law firms, investment banks and top consulting 
firms. Here, up-or-out dominates, while internal labor markets dominate where work is less 
demanding or payoffs are more compressed, for instance, because the environment is less 
competitive. We present some supporting evidence from academia, comparing US with 
French economics departments. 
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Status is an important determinant for human behavior, a proposition that is supported by
psychologists and economists alike (e.g. Frank, 1988, Huberman et al., 2004, Moldovanu
et al., 2007). Status concerns are particularly important at work; people spend much of
their time at the workplace, and their behavior at work is an important determinant of an
economy￿ s e¢ ciency. The goal of gaining higher status in an organization motivates people to
work hard for long periods of time; examples from the academic world, law ￿rms, investment
banks, and consulting ￿rms abound. Making partner at a law ￿rm, or getting tenure in a
university provides much stronger motivation than just getting a wage rise.
Chester Barnard (1938, p.145), the ￿rst modern management theorist, was well aware of
the relevance of status for motivation and the necessity to provide both monetary rewards
and status: "Even in strictly commercial organizations, where it is least supposed to be true,
money without distinction, prestige, position, is so utterly ine⁄ective that it is rare that
greater income can be made to serve even temporarily as an inducement if accompanied by
surpression of prestige." Peter Drucker (1954, p. 154) expressed similar thoughts: "But
￿nancial rewards are not enough. People, whether managers or workers, whether in business
or outside, need rewards of prestige and pride." Indeed, most organizations do not only
provide monetary incentives, but they also allocate status between workers by giving them
awards, o¢ ce space, company cars, and, arguably most importantly, promotions.
Given the prominence of status concerns and the widespread use of promotion hierar-
chies, it is surprising that there are only a few papers in economics that have investigated the
design of organizations and incentive contracts in the presence of status concerns (Auriol and
Renault 2001, 2008, and Besley and Ghatak, 2008).1 The main result of Auriol and Renault
(2001, 2008) is that junior workers should get minimal status and ￿xed wage, and no bonus;
their work incentives come solely from the perspective of getting a promotion. This result,
1Status in Auriol and Renault (2001, 2008) and Besley and Ghatak (2008) is di⁄erent from Moldovanu
et al. (2007), in which money is the source of status. As we are interested in organizational design, it is
natural to focus on rank in a hierarchy as the source for status.
1however, is derived in a model in which ￿rms do not ￿re workers if they are unsuccessful.
In reality, there are two dominant forms of promotion hierarchies, the ￿internal labor mar-
ket￿and the ￿up-or-out system￿ . Doeringer and Piore (1971) remarked that ￿rms maintain
internal labor markets in which there are job guarantees, incentives are given through pro-
motion hierarchies, and wages are associated to job titles (see for instance, Baker et al.,
1994). ￿Up-or-out￿exposes employees to more risk and steeper incentives. Employees work
for some years as juniors with the explicit or implicit understanding that upon completion
of this phase, they will either be promoted or will have to leave the ￿rm.
We extend the Auriol and Renault (2001, 2008) framework to provide an explicit com-
parison of internal labor markets with up-or-out systems. We derive these hierarchies as
solutions to a simple dynamic agency model, describe their properties in terms of pro￿ts,
wages paid to juniors and seniors, and the span of control implied. We determine when
one or the other is optimal, generate some empirical predictions, and collect supporting ev-
idence. We also consider heterogeneous workers and endogenize workers￿outside options by
considering self-employment opportunities.
An important literature has looked at the rationale for ￿rms to maintain internal labor
markets,2 and up-or-out has attracted much attention among economists as well.3 However,
most of the literature on internal labor markets and up-or-out argues that promotion hier-
archies solve contracting issues related to non-veri￿able output and speci￿c human capital
accumulation. In our theory, output is veri￿able, and promotion hierarchies are designed
in response to human beings￿need for status. Indeed, in many sectors in which up-or-out
is applied, output is readily observable and veri￿able. In academia, the research output of
individuals is not only used as the basis for the promotion decisions taken by the university,
but also for the allocation of public funds (e.g. in Germany and the UK). In particular, in
the natural sciences or economics, the ￿value￿of a scientist in terms of scienti￿c output can
2For surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature, see Gibbons and Waldman (1999), and Waldman
(2009).
3Below we review the relationship to the following papers: Demougin and Siow (1994), O￿ Flaherty and
Siow (1995), Kahn and Huberman (1988), Waldman (1990), Ghosh and Waldman (2010).
2be determined pretty neatly by looking at their CV. The same is true for investment bankers
(the return on the funds invested or the pro￿ts generated) or lawyers (size and frequency of
cases won, or clients acquired).
In our model, there is one large ￿rm that o⁄ers workers either an internal labor market, or
up-or-out. Workers can choose to be self-employed or to work in the large ￿rm. Three di⁄er-
ent employment forms are hence generated from the same model: self-employment, internal
labor markets, and up-or-out systems. By working in the promotion hierarchy, workers re-
ceive the opportunity of gaining additional status. The ￿rm allocates status among workers
by means of job titles or ranks. For incentive purposes, all juniors enjoy the same low status
and successful agents receive a large increase in status through promotions. In equilibrium,
only productive agents enter the large ￿rm and as everyone exerts the same e⁄ort, workers
take a status gamble. Self-employment, in which there is no reallocation of status,4 is pre-
ferred by less productive workers, because they have little to gain from competing for status
and incentive pay with more productive types. Thus, promotion hierarchies function as a
screening device ensuring that only productive workers enter a ￿rm, and ￿rms make pro￿ts
by using promotion hierarchies.5
The large ￿rm makes pro￿ts because junior workers receive wages below the output they
produce. They enjoy little status, but they face steep incentives by the prospect of receiving
both a large ￿xed wage, a substantial bonus and high status in the ￿rm when promoted
upon a success. Thus, both junior and senior workers are exerting more e⁄ort than in
self-employment. These productivity gains are shared between the ￿rm and the successful
workers who are promoted. An entrepreneur who would hire only one worker or hire more
than one worker without di⁄erentiating their status would not make pro￿ts because workers
have the alternative to be self-employed.
4Notice that we are not saying that there are no social status concerns of self-employed, as the market
for Rolex or Porsche demonstrates. However, such external symbols are di⁄erent from the internal status
symbols like promotions. Internal status can be controlled by the ￿rm and is, consequently, an element of
organizational design, which is the focus of our paper.
5This is a similar mechanism as the one in von Siemens (2010) in which a ￿rm can prevent inequity-averse
low-ability workers from entering by not compensating them for rent di⁄erences within the ￿rm.
3We derive the optimal incentive and promotion scheme both for internal labor markets
and for up-or-out systems. We identify the situations in which internal labor markets and
those in which up-or-out contracts are optimal. We ￿nd that in terms of the pro￿ts of the
￿rm, up-or-out is always optimal if it is very di¢ cult to achieve a success. When success
is less hard to achieve, the internal labor market is optimal provided the payo⁄ associated
with success is small enough. Otherwise up-or-out is, again, optimal. The results are in line
with observations that up-or-out is the predominant system in modern academia, law ￿rms,
investment banks, and top consulting ￿rms, while internal labor markets dominate where
work is less demanding and where payo⁄s are more compressed, for instance, in industries
that are quite mature and o⁄er little growth opportunities, such as manufacturing.
Our theory generates a number of predictions. First, the variance of career success
(measured in wages and status) of a cohort entering an internal labor market is lower than
the one of a cohort entering an up-or-out hierarchy. Second, juniors work harder in up-or-
out than in an internal labor market; while this is not necessarily so for seniors. Third,
the model predicts di⁄erences in the spans of control in up-or-out and in an internal labor
market: the ratio of juniors and (in the case of the internal labor market) unsuccessful seniors
over successful (promoted) seniors is smaller in up-or-out than in the internal labor market.
The prediction on the span of control seems to be the most fruitful avenue to generate
empirical support.6 We hence have collected some information about the top 50 economics
departments in the U.S. (an up-or-out system) and in France (an internal labor market, in
which tenure is given at the entry level). The results are in line with the prediction of the
model: the span of control in France is more than three times higher than the one in U.S.
research departments.
The next section relates our paper to the literature; Section 3 sets up the model; Sec-
tion 4 presents the main results. Section 5 derives implications and presents our empirical
observations. Section 6 concludes.
6Notice that a large variance in wages is also a natural feature of models in which promotion is a signal.
Furthermore, it is hard to compare the e⁄ort levels of seniors empirically.
42. Related Literature
We share a common interest with the existing papers on up-or-out contracts, but there are
some notable di⁄erences, both in terms of underlying assumptions and predictions. First,
Demougin and Siow (1994) and O￿ Flaherty and Siow (1995) are not about incentives. Rather,
￿rms decide on either to sta⁄all junior positions with trainees for managerial positions only,
or to sta⁄ the junior positions also with people who work productively. Whether or not up-
or-out is optimal depends on demand. In particular, if current demand is low, but growth
is high, up-or-out is optimal. We consider a steady state organization, and in our theory,
juniors and seniors do the same kind of work, which seems a fair description of law ￿rms,
consulting or academia. The main interest that relates us to Demougin and Siow (1994)
and O￿ Flaherty and Siow (1995) lies in determining the relative sizes of di⁄erent hierarchical
levels and, thus, the span of control of hierarchies.
The second group of papers is on incentives. Kahn and Huberman (1988) suggest a
model in which ￿rms want to incentivize agents to invest in human capital, but there is
limited commitment of the ￿rms. Output is only observable to the ￿rm; it thus may pretend
that the output is not high enough in order to save on the promised reward. This would
undermine the incentive e⁄ects of the proposed reward. By announcing that anyone who
does not get the reward will be ￿red, the ￿rm can commit itself not to cheat, because
otherwise it will lose the accumulated human capital of the worker. The model combines
bilateral moral hazard with the assumption that output cannot be veri￿ed. Prendergast
(1993) suggests a model in which promotions, together with wage structures that a ￿rm
can commit itself to, can solve similar problems related to unveri￿ability and speci￿c human
capital acquisition. The assumption of unveri￿able output is also present in Waldman (1984)
and (1990) and in Ghosh and Waldman (2010) in which promotion is a signal to the outside
world about the productivity of a person, while output is not observable to the outside world.
Waldman (1984) introduced this idea and then showed (Waldman, 1990) that the Kahn and
Huberman (1988) model works in a setting with general human capital if promotion as a
signal is considered. Ghosh and Waldman (2010) compare standard promotion practices
5(similar to what we call an internal labor market) with up-or-out, and show that up-or-out
is optimal if ￿rm-speci￿c human capital is low. They also show that if the ￿rm can commit
to a wage ￿ oor, up-or-out is used when low and high-level jobs are similar.
Our paper is di⁄erent from the literature, because we do not focus on the acquisition
of speci￿c human capital. In our model, promotion systems are used to di⁄erentiate the
status of workers, for the purpose of generating e⁄ort incentives. Human capital is certainly
an important element determining optimal promotion systems, but as our theory shows, it
is not a necessary condition for an incentive theory of promotion hierarchies to exist. Our
theory applies when people care about status and veri￿ability of output is not an issue, while
the other theories apply when output cannot be veri￿ed and people have standard utility
functions.
3. Model
We employ an overlapping generation model. At any date, the organization is sta⁄ed with
members of two generations. Each person has a work life time of two periods. Juniors
enter the organization and work their ￿rst period, and seniors who joined the organization
in the previous period are spending the last period of their working life in the ￿rm. It is
assumed that the population of agents is constant and large so that it may be represented
by a continuum. The size of the workforce employed by the ￿rm is normalized to 2, that is,
we look at a ￿rm in steady state.








t (Qt ￿ Wt): (1)
where Qt is total output (its price is normalized to 1 without loss of generality) and Wt is the
wage bill in period t. The principal￿ s objective function is intertemporally separable with a
discount factor ￿ ￿ 1. In what follows, we set ￿ = 1 which is innocuous for our purpose.
6The organizational designer uses two instruments, compensation and allocation of status.
Before setting up the full program of the designer, we describe the production process,
workers￿preferences, and the feasible allocations of status.
3.1 Production
Each worker living at date t, junior or senior, exerts an e⁄ort ei
t ￿ 0 through which he
contributes an amount qi
t to the ￿rm￿ s output. Workers are hired to do the same type of
work. With probability ￿(ei
t), qi
t is high (qi
t = q+￿q; ￿q > 0), and with probability 1￿￿(ei
t),
qi
t is low (qi




is random. Individual output qi
t is veri￿able and its realization is independent across time.
The probability of high output of agent i, ￿(ei
t), increases with ei










t is ex-post veri￿able, the e⁄ort level ei
t is not. There are two types of









The larger is a￿, the more di¢ cult it is for an agent to achieve a high output.7 In equilibrium
the probability of success is inversely related to a￿. To capture the idea that g workers are
more productive than b workers we assume that ab > ag > 0:
7Equivalently, we could assume ￿￿(e) = minf e
a￿ ;1g and  ￿(e) = e
2
2 , with similar results.
73.2 Preferences
We assume that utilities are additively separable across periods with some discount factor
(which we will set to one). Workers are protected by limited liability. In any of the periods
an agent with productivity of type ￿, with status s ￿ 0, income w ￿ 0, and e⁄ort level e ￿ 0
has the following utility function:
U￿(s;w;e) = sw ￿  ￿(e): (2)
Our assumption that money and status re-enforce each other requires some explanations.
We posit the same utility function as Auriol and Renault (2008), which is situated between
perfect substitutes and perfect complements. The indi⁄erence curves for money and status
at given e⁄ort level are strictly decreasing, thus there is some substitution between status
and income. This substitution is however imperfect: a superb job title does not compensate
for a wage of nil, nor does a stellar wage make up for a lack of appreciation by others. The
utility function also implies that the marginal rate of substitution between e⁄ort and income
is decreasing in status. Put di⁄erently, for a given level of monetary incentives, an agent
should be all the more willing to exert e⁄ort when she has higher status. Furthermore,
the marginal rate of substitution between e⁄ort and status is decreasing in income. Thus,
individuals with higher income will be willing to exert more e⁄ort in order to improve their
status. Maslow￿ s (1954) hierarchy of needs is in line with this, and Centers and Bugental
(1966) ￿nd evidence employees earning higher wages care more for factors at the top of
Maslow￿ s hierarchy of needs.
These observations indicate that our assumption is a reasonable one, but direct empirical
evidence on the shape of utility functions is hard to ￿nd. While some authors in the literature
on status have conjectured that there are the complementarities we assume (for instance,
Kosfeld and Neckermann, forthcoming), systematic evidence about the interplay between
status and social recognition, and money is so far lacking in economics. A ￿rst piece of
evidence from experimental economics is by Bradler and Neckermann (2011) who found that
8in a ￿eld experiment a monetary reward and a thank-you card (albeit given to everybody)
increased performance to some limited extent when given in combination. Evidence on the
re-enforcement of money and social recognition exists in industrial psychology. In particular,
Stajkovic and Luthans (2003) carry out a meta-analysis of 72 studies with more than 13,000
subjects. They ￿nd that provided that there is performance feedback (as in our theory
in which performance is common knowledge), monetary incentives and social recognition
re-enforce each other, as postulated in our theory.
3.3 Organizational design
An organization can establish a status ranking of their workers through di⁄erent means like
the distribution of wages, the allocation of scarce nonmonetary resources, e.g., corner o¢ ces,
or, most commonly, the hierarchical structure. Some of these attributes also provide material
bene￿ts, whereas others are purely symbolic and are valued for the social or psychological
bene￿ts they entail. We focus on these non-material sources of status, such as rank in the
organization.
Any organization will be constrained in its allocation decision because increasing one
individual￿ s status comes at the expense of decreasing somebody else￿ s status. We thus
assume that status is ￿rm-speci￿c. To be more speci￿c the set of feasible social status







t ￿ 0 8i;t: (A.1)
For each agent, the organizational designer chooses a social status allocation si
t in (A.1),
a ￿xed wage wi
t, and a bonus ￿wi
t in case of a high performance. Status is allocated before
the workers exert e⁄ort. That is, when an agent joins the organization he is assigned to a
rank somewhere in the hierarchy. The position is revised at the end of the ￿rst period based
on performance.
There are two sensible promotion hierarchies in our setting. First, in an up-or-out system,
9successful former juniors are promoted and become seniors, while unsuccessful juniors have
to leave. Second, in an internal labor market, again, successful juniors become seniors, but
unsuccessful juniors are o⁄ered to stay in the ￿rm and become seniors. We will show though
that these unsuccessful seniors will receive a di⁄erent ￿xed wage and status compared to
their successful colleagues of the same cohort. Also, in both systems, unproductive types
will stay outside of the ￿rm.
Notice that other promotion hierarchies do not make sense because (i) a company will
rationally always employ juniors; (ii) ￿ring successful seniors would provide negative incen-
tives.
The timing for a cohort joining the organization at date t is as follows.
date 0: A new cohort of workers are o⁄ered contracts that include a junior status level, a
￿xed wage and an incentive wage for the ￿rst period. The ￿rm also commits itself to
a second-period contract which includes a rule for allocating status, ￿xed wages and
incentive wages contingent on ￿rst-period performance. The ￿rm also commits itself
whether to provide an employment guarantee or to ￿re unsuccessful seniors and replace
them by new juniors.
date 0:5: Junior workers choose an e⁄ort level given all of the above.
date 1: Outputs are observed, transfers occur and agents are promoted, retained or ￿red
according to the terms of the contract. New juniors enter the ￿rm.
date 1:5: Senior workers choose an e⁄ort level according to their current monetary incentive
and status.
date 2: Outputs are observed, transfers occur, senior workers retire.
As the outcome qi
t which depends on e⁄ort at date t is random, some agents will be
successful and others not. Then an agent is characterized by its productivity b or g, and by
the fact that he is either a junior worker indexed 1, or a senior worker with a history of high
past performance, denoted h, or a history of low past performance, denoted l.
104. Solution of the model
4.1 Outside option
In each period agents can work as individual entrepreneurs outside the ￿rm; agents have the
same kind of productivity inside and outside the ￿rm. The only di⁄erence is that they work
individually and, therefore, they cannot change the status allocation in their one-person ￿rm.
Hence, they also face di⁄erent incentives. As each worker is born with one unit of status,
the per-period utility of a self-employed is given as





A self-employed agent will choose the optimal e⁄ort level ei =
￿q
ai for all t. The resulting
expected utility is




Since ab > ag; reservation utility is type-dependent with Ug > Ub.
4.2 Workers￿optimal e⁄ort choices
In the following, we assume that the ￿rm is in steady state and consequently drop the
time index. We consider ￿rst the problem of a senior worker at date 1:5. This problem
is isomorphic in both promotion hierarchies, although the respective status allocations and
wages di⁄er. We can thus save on notation in terms of the type of the hierarchy considered.
Let eip(sp;wp;￿wp) denote the optimal e⁄ort level of senior worker of type i 2 fg;bg
with status sp and compensation (wp;￿wp); where index p = l stands for low and h for high
past performance. The agent maximizes the following programme:














; p 2 fh;lg: (5)
We consider next the problem of a junior worker of type i maximizing his expected utility,
at date t = 0:5. Agent i chooses his e⁄ort ei1 to solve:





Here ￿Ui = EUih￿Ui in an up-or-out system and ￿Ui = EUih￿EUil for the internal labor










We will restrict the analysis to the meaningful case in which there is an interior solution
with respect to e⁄ort. This can be guaranteed by assuming ag to be high and ￿q low enough
so that in equilibrium ei1 < 1 and eip ￿ 1:
ag ￿ 37:5q and ￿q ￿ 5q: (A.2)
4.3 Optimal incentive contracts without status di⁄erentiation
We here brie￿ y describe a benchmark case in which the ￿rm relies only on monetary incen-
tives. Status allocation is constant and identical among workers so that sit = 1 8i;t. In this
classical principal/agent problem there is no bene￿t for the ￿rm to postpone rewards. As
the agents are risk neutral with respect to income, the optimal dynamic solution is simply
the replication of the optimal static solution.
Thus, the ￿rm maximizes the expected pro￿t function with respect to ￿xed wage and
bonus allocation. Assuming that there is a proportion x of good and (1 ￿ x) of bad agents,
12the program is as follows:
max
wi;￿wi
￿ = x(q ￿ wg + eg(￿q ￿ ￿wg)) + (1 ￿ x)(q ￿ wb + eb(￿q ￿ ￿wb)) (8)
subject to












￿ Ui = q +
￿q2
2ai
;i 2 fg;bg: (IR)
LL stands for limited liability, IC is the incentive compatibility, and IR the individual
rationality constraint. In the program above we have implicitly assumed that the ￿rm is
able to sort out workers of type b and g at zero cost.
We can readily show that the optimal solution derived under this assumption is imple-
mentable under the more realistic framework of asymmetric information. Under assumption
A.2 we get an interior solution for the e⁄ort: ei =
￿wi
ai . The IR constraint then writes:
EUi = wi +
￿w2
i
2ai ￿ q +
￿q2
2ai , i 2 fg;bg: The ￿rm￿ s objective function decreases with wi so





2ai in (8) and optimizing with
respect to ￿wi yields: ￿wi = ￿q so that wi = q 8 i 2 fg;bg. This solution is implementable
under asymmetric information as workers become residual claimants of their work and the
￿rm makes zero pro￿t on both types of workers:
Result 1 If status is not di⁄erentiated, the pro￿t maximizing incentive contract, w = q and
￿w = ￿q, is independent of the type or seniority of workers. Both types of workers
are entering the ￿rm, and the ￿rm makes zero pro￿t.
134.4 Two types of promotion hierarchy
In this subsection we present two propositions describing the wages in the up-or-out system,
and in the internal labor market. We then investigate under what conditions either one or
the other is optimal for the ￿rm. The propositions build on one of the main results in Auriol
and Renault (2008), namely that juniors receive zero wages and status (Auriol and Renault,
2008, Proposition 3). Our main contribution is to investigate the precise shapes of the
promotion hierarchy, and to predict under what circumstances either of the two promotion
systems is optimal. The paper also shows that a promotion hierarchy acts as a device to
make less productive types stay outside of the ￿rm (which increases pro￿ts of the ￿rm).
In the up-or-out system, the ￿rm maximizes expected output minus wages, subject to the
ex ante participation constraint of the good worker, and the interim participation constraint
of a successful worker to be satis￿ed. The ￿rm also faces the status feasibility constraint
(A.1) and limited liability constraints.
The following Proposition fully characterizes the optimal up-or-out system. The proof
for this and the other propositions can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 In an up-or-out system, unsuccessful former juniors must leave the ￿rm,
while successful juniors are promoted. The optimal up-or-out contract induces sorting, that
is, only the good workers apply for jobs in the ￿rm. Wages and status allocation are as
























The up-or-out hierarchy provides strong incentives to junior workers. By bundling social
and material rewards in one state of the world, large ￿rms create prizes for their workers
who are willing to take the gamble to get the prestigious and lucrative promotion. They










g > eg =
￿q
ag ) in the hope
to stay on board and receive a substantial increase in status and high wages. The principal
actually loses money on the promoted seniors, but this loss is more than compensated by
the surplus he extracts from the juniors. A large ￿rm that o⁄ers an up-or-out hierarchy
14engineers promotion packages that combine social and material rewards, and, through this
packaging, makes pro￿ts.
The o⁄er of a promotion hierarchy also makes it possible to sort out at no cost the most
productive workers. Indeed, in up-or-out promotion systems social and monetary rewards
are not only delayed in time, as in any promotion system, but they are allocated only to
successful employees. With such a structure workers with low ability are less likely to get
a reward for their e⁄ort. They rather stick to self-employment. The ability to attract the
most productive workers and to extract a high level of e⁄ort from them creates a competitive
edge for large ￿rms.
The program in the internal labor market has one main di⁄erence compared to the up-
or-out system: in the internal labor market, nobody is ￿red. Unsuccessful juniors stay in
the ￿rm, but the ￿rm distinguishes status and wages of successful vs. unsuccessful seniors.
The optimal internal labor market is characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In an internal labor market, all workers stay in the ￿rm. The optimal
internal labor market contract induces sorting, that is, only the good workers apply for jobs
in the ￿rm. Wages and status allocation are as follows: (i) junior workers receive minimum
rewards and status (wI
1 = 0;￿wI
1 = 0;sI

























Ug + 1 ￿ 1
￿; (9)























Ug + 1 ￿ 1
￿: (10)
Unsuccessful seniors receive a lower status compared to their successful counterparts. In
a way similar to the up-or-out contract, a ￿rm with an internal labor market loses money on
15both types of seniors, but this loss is more than compensated by the surplus extracted from
the juniors.
Both up-or-out and the internal labor market succeed in inducing sorting and in both
types of promotion hierarchies, juniors only receive incentives linked to promotion. Seniors
have ￿rst best incentives; they receive the entire surplus associated with a success. Compar-
ing the pro￿ts of the ￿rm in the two systems we can answer the question of optimality of
the two systems in the next Proposition.
Proposition 3 A ￿rm￿ s optimal choice between up-or-out or internal labor market depends
on the payo⁄ associated to a success ￿q, and the di¢ culty of achieving a success for the
productive workers ag: (i) if ￿q is su¢ ciently large compared to q (
￿q
q ￿ ￿l ￿ 1:513),
then, up-or-out is optimal; (ii) if
￿q
q < ￿l and ag su¢ ciently large compared to q (
ag
q ￿
al ￿ 159:36), then, again up or out is optimal; (iii) otherwise, the internal labor market is
optimal.
5. Implications
The last Proposition establishes that the up-or-out system dominates when the surplus
generated by high e⁄ort is su¢ ciently large and whenever the di¢ culty of achieving a success
is su¢ ciently large. This is in line with casual observations that up-or-out dominates in
￿elds in which there are large sums at stake or in which people have to work very hard to
succeed. Examples include law ￿rms or consulting ￿rms in which winning a law suit or a new,
important client makes all the di⁄erence and people work both intensively and extensively,
in particular when ￿ghting for partnership status. But this also is in line with the arts, as
for example in the music business where the ￿up￿consists in a long-term contract with a
publishing house, or in science where the ￿up￿is getting tenure. As we all know, in many
(but not all) countries scientists are used to be granted tenure only after six to ten years on
the job, and not making tenure at a prestigious university is perceived as a substantial loss
in expected status.
165.1 Predictions
An applied theory like ours should generate empirical predictions allowing to test it against
alternative theories and to corroborate its assumptions. We here ￿rst discuss some of these
testable implications, and then present some descriptive statistics from U.S. and French
economics departments, which are in line with a prediction of our theory.
A ￿rst observation relates to the wage and status pro￿les over time. Juniors who enter
the up-or-out system have a higher variance in terms of both status and wages than in
the internal labor market: successful seniors are promoted to jobs with high wages and high
status, while unsuccessful seniors leave to self-employment. In the internal labor market both
wage and status pro￿les are less steep than under up or out. Most importantly, unsuccessful
seniors stay in the ￿rm and enjoy positive status. Nonetheless, in both systems, juniors are
paid minimum wages and receive no status.
A second observation builds on a comparison of e⁄ort levels of juniors. Omitting the









ag in the internal labor market. Thus, we have
eI
1 = 1 p
2eU
1 ; hence juniors work harder under an up-or-out contract. This seems to be in line
with casual evidence, whereby junior employees in industries that use up-or-out contracts
such as consulting, law, or investment banking, are reputed to work harder than junior
employees in industries that use internal labor markets.













internal labor market. We have 1 ￿ sI
l ￿ 2 ￿ sI
h. Therefore, successful seniors work harder
than unsuccessful seniors in the internal labor market. However, for the high performers
of the past in the two systems, the comparison is not as clear cut. We can have sU
h R sI
h.
Therefore, seniors in the top position of a ￿rm with an internal labor market (e.g. c-level
executives in large industrial companies) may work harder than seniors in a ￿rm that employs
up-or-out contracts.
A fourth prediction applies to spans of control as implied by the two promotion systems.
As juniors work harder in an up-or-out hierarchy, there are more successful seniors than
17in an internal labor market, but not everyone succeeds. Unsuccessful seniors are replaced
by new juniors, while in an internal labor market, the unsuccessful seniors stay on. As a
consequence, the ratio of juniors and unsuccessful seniors over successful seniors in an ILM
is larger than the ratio of juniors over seniors in an up-or-out organization.
5.2 An empirical observation in line with the model
The last prediction can be investigated by constructing the ratio with data from U.S. and
French economics departments. In the U.S., assistant professors take up to 10 years to receive
tenure, usually as full professor, but in many countries in continental Europe, universities
give researchers tenure at the entry level. We gathered information about the numbers
of full professors, associate and assistant professors from 50 top U.S. research universities
as ranked by Dusansky and Vernon (1998), as well as from the largest 50 French economics
departments as ranked by Bosquet et al. (2010).8 For the U.S. system we count both assistant
and associate professors as juniors, leaving aside the fact that there are some places that
give tenure on the associate level. For the French system, we use the fact that researchers
at universities maintain the entry level ￿Maitre de confØrences￿unless they are promoted
to the rank of professor through a nation-wide competition. Similarly, researchers in other
institution such as the CNRS, the national science center, can either stay on the entry level
(￿chargØ de recherche￿ ), or be promoted (￿directeur de recherche￿ ).
We can thus compare the ratio of assistant and associate professors over full professors
in the U.S. (Table 1), with the ratio of the so-called Rank B (juniors and non-promoted
seniors) to Rank A (senior researchers and professors) in France (Table 2). Notice that
U.S. universities are ranked in alphabetical order, while French ones by rank, for reasons
explained below.
<Tables 1, 2 about here.>
8We are grateful to Pierre-Philippe Combes who provided us with the data from Bosquet et al. (2010)
and helped us in using the data. U.S. data are hand-collected from the departments￿websites.
18Just as predicted by the model, the U.S. ratio is much smaller (0.73) than the French
ratio (2.8), a di⁄erence that a Mann-Whitney test identi￿es as highly signi￿cant (p < 0:001).
This supporting evidence ￿ts the di⁄erent missions of U.S. and French universities, which are
quite similar to what our theory predicts about the optimality of up-or-out vs. internal labor
market. U.S. research universities are largely oriented towards producing research output for
the international market. French universities have a mixed set of objectives. Traditionally,
there has been a division of labor between the CNRS, and universities, which are supposed
to be more teaching-oriented. While some universities have developed remarkable scienti￿c
capacity, the research output of most universities is quite low compared to the U.S.. The
goals and production technology of French universities and the associated expected payo⁄s
are hence di⁄erent from the ones in U.S. research universities. While in the U.S. it is relatively
hard to achieve a success, such as for instance, publications in the American Economic
Review, Econometrica or Science, it is easier to publish in a French-speaking journal or
provide undergraduates with reasonable teaching. Similarly, the payo⁄s of achieving the
respective success are smaller in France than in the U.S..
We ￿nd another piece of evidence that is in line with our theory (and the reason for
arranging french universities by rank). The French university system is currently undergo-
ing a transformation that is quite similar to many other European countries. In the course
of this transformation which involves increased autonomy, and funding related to research
performance, the di⁄erence between the stronger and weaker economics departments is in-
creasing. Only few of the French departments can be meaningfully compared to their U.S.
counterparts in terms of research output. However, a clear picture emerges: while the top
20 departments have a junior/senior ratio of 1.6, the following 30 departments have a ratio
of 3.7. This means that the better ranked the departments in terms of scienti￿c output, and
hence the closer the departments in terms of their mission to the ideal of scienti￿c excellence,
the less substantial is the di⁄erence of the ratio to the U.S. departments.
We would like to point out that these ￿gures should not be overinterpreted as a test of
the model, because a number of institutional speci￿cities make it impossible to exclude other
19factors. In particular, in our model, the ￿rm is in steady state, and this is de￿nitely not the
case in France. We nonetheless see these observations as support for our theory.
6. Concluding remarks
We have suggested a simple dynamic agency model in which ￿rms can make pro￿ts by
o⁄ering promotion opportunities to successful juniors. The hierarchies di⁄er with respect to
the treatment of unsuccessful juniors. In up-or-out, these unsuccessful juniors must go, while
in the internal labor market they can stay. We have shown that these promotion hierarchies
both succeed in inducing sorting: only the more productive workers want to work in these
organizations. We have also derived some testable implications, and ￿nd some corroborative
data from the French and the U.S. university system. We have shown that up-or-out is the
pro￿t maximizing promotion hierarchy for very high payo⁄s of successful work of juniors
and when the task is causing high costs of e⁄ort, while otherwise internal labor markets
dominate.
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23Proof of Proposition 1
We take Proposition 3 from Auriol and Renault (2008) as given:
Proposition 3 (Auriol and Renault, 2008): Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, in any steady
state of a pro￿t-maximizing solution, we have:
￿w1 = w1 = s1 = 0: (11)
sh > sl (12)
wh ￿ wl and ￿wh ￿ ￿wl (13)
where at least one of the inequalities in (13) is strict.
Thus, juniors receive minimal wages and status. If A.2 holds, ag is such that in equilibrium
eU



























gh = 1, EUh = EU0
h, and E￿ = E￿0. QED





ai , and by assumption eU
i1 =
￿Ui

























2ai with ￿Ui =































































































































































































It is useful to de￿ne



















From the Lagrangian, we derive the following conditions:












































































































h (ag + ￿Ug)















+ ￿h = 0 (25)
To derive the optimal up-or-out contract as stated in Proposition 1, we assume that equilib-
rium satis￿es the following two conditions:
w
U
h > 0 which implies ￿h = 0 (26)
￿b = 0 which implies EUb1 < 2Ub: (27)
After deriving the optimal contract, we will check that (26) is ful￿lled in equilibrium, and
that (27) is implied by (26).
The following preliminary result is helpful:
Lemma 2 When at the optimum wU
h > 0; then ￿wU
h = ￿q.
Assume that at the optimum ￿wU
h is such that ￿wU
h < ￿q while wU
h > 0. Let ￿ > 0 and
￿￿ > 0 be such that wU0
h = wU
h ￿￿ ￿ 0 and ￿wU0
h = ￿wU



















By construction, the expected utility of a gh worker is unchanged. However the principal￿ s





ag , but economizes ￿. Her


























































. Since by construction, ￿wU0
h = ￿wU










From (25), (26), and (27), we have sU
h =
2￿Ug
B(ag+￿Ug). Substituting this expression in







= ￿h. Lemma 2 and (26)
then imply that ￿h = 0. Substituting ￿h = 0 and ￿b = 0 from (27) in (21) and applying
￿wU



















































We now proceed to show that ￿g > 0: Substituting for B in (20), using the fact that ￿h, ￿b
= 0; and substituting for ￿wU












for D and rearranging yields: ￿g
￿Ug









































ag . From (28) together with eU
g1 < 1, we know sU











4 . Given the individual
rationality constraint (IRg1), this is ful￿lled for
￿q
4 < 2Ug. A su¢ cient condition is ￿q < 8q
which is always ful￿lled under A.2.
Now, ￿g
￿Ug
ag + ￿ > 0 implies ￿g > 0 and ￿ = 0. Assume, to the contrary, ￿ > 0. From




2ag ￿ 2Ug cannot be ful￿lled. Given that ￿ = 0, we must have ￿g > 0. Hence,
￿U2
g
2ag = 2Ug or ￿Ug = 2
p
agUg. We therefore have in (28) sU




Ug > 1: Substituting
this value in (29) together with Lemma (2) yields the three conditions of Proposition 1.
It remains to be shown that pro￿t is positive for the ￿rm given these speci￿cations.












































g1 > 0. Let a =
ag
q and ￿ =
￿q







2a + ￿2 2 (0; 10
p
2















@￿ > 0, it su¢ ces to show that u(a;￿)is
positive for the lowest values a and ￿. We have u(37:5;0) s 1:06.
Finally, we need to check that the solution satis￿es (26), and (27), and eU
g1 < 1, eU
gh ￿ 1.













> 0. Substituting for sU
h and Ug we













LHS is increasing in ag and the RHS decreasing. Given A.2, we can thus set ag = 37:5q. For
￿q
q < 5 (by A.2), the su¢ cient condition is ful￿lled.
Second, we check eU





h ￿ Ug < ag. Substituting
(29) for sU
hwU
h ; yields the condition sU
h > 2. This is equivalent to a2


























q t 25q and ful￿lled
given A.2.


















: Inserting the outside option values Ui = q+
￿q2
























. The second term on the RHS is negative since













, which is always ful￿lled
since sU
h > 2. Thus, a low-ability worker would never like to enter the ￿rm.
We ￿nish with eU
gh ￿ 1 which is equivalent to ag ￿ sU
h￿q. Substituting for sU
h, one can
check that the inequality is equivalent to a2
g ￿ 4ag￿q + 2￿q2 + a2
g
2agq
￿q2+2agq ￿ 0. Neglecting
















q < 5 by A.2. QED
29Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is closely related to Proposition 3 in Auriol and Renault (2001), but we here
consider two types of agents and identify a separating equilibrium with shutdown of the less
productive type (IRb1).





















































l = 2 (status feasibility)
w
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30From the Lagrangian, we derive the following conditions:









































































































































































































































































































+ ￿l = 0 (36)




h > 0 and w
I
l > 0 ) ￿h = ￿l = 0 (37)
￿b = 0 ) EUb1 < 2Ub (38)
EUgl = Ug ) ￿ > 0 (39)









It will be checked that these conditions are ful￿lled at equilibrium and that condition (35)















= ￿h. Similarly, from (30)












= ￿l: Lemma 2 then implies ￿h = ￿l = 0.









￿UgG. Applying (34) and (35) to (32),





































ag . Equating these
two expressions for ￿ it follows that (sI
h;sI





































































































l +2q. Inserting wI
h; sI
l and wI




























g1 + 1 ￿ 1
￿￿
+ 2 > 0: As
in the proof of Proposition 1, let a =
ag
q and ￿ =
￿q
q with a ￿ 37:5 and ￿ ￿ 5 as
















g1(a;￿) + 1 ￿ 1
￿￿
+ 2 > 0. It is
@g(a;￿)
@a > 0 and
@g(a;￿)
@￿ > 0. It remains to be shown that g (a;￿) is positive for the lowest values a and ￿.
We have g (37:5;0) s 0:51.





































































￿ < ab. Since the LHS < ag
and by assumption ag < ab this condition is always ful￿lled.




￿UgG: Inserting values for G, ￿Ug and
































ag (y ￿ 1)
￿




Ug + 1. A su¢ cient condition for this to be ful￿lled is 3
p
2agUg > 2y￿q or
4a2
gq3 + 38
9 agq2￿q2 + 115




81￿q4ag. A su¢ cient condition for this is 4a2
gq3 +
38
9 agq2￿q2 ￿ 32










. Given assumption A.2 we have ag ￿ 37:5q.










. This is ful￿lled for
￿q
q < 5 as given by A.2.

































































































h, and y :=
rq
2ag

































> 0. A su¢ cient condi-
tion is ￿q ￿4Ug +
q
1





4 > 4q +
2￿q2
ag .
The LHS is increasing in ag and the RHS decreasing. Given assumption A.2, a su¢ -
cient condition is thus to set ag = 75





4 > 4q +
4￿q2





















q ￿ 5 as given by Assumption A.2,
this is always ful￿lled.








ag < 1. We have to have ag > sI
h￿q







Ug + 1 > 2￿q
rq
2ag
Ug + 1. Given eI
g1 < 1
we have ag >
p
2agUg. A su¢ cient condition is thus
p




34assumption A.2 we have ag ￿ 37:5q. We thus have to show 37:5 ￿ 3
2
￿q2
q2 . This is ful￿lled for
￿q
q ￿ 5 as given by assumption A.2. QED
35Proof of Proposition 3



























l + 2q (45)
De￿ning ￿￿ as the di⁄erence in pro￿ts between up-or-out and internal labor market and
using that eI











































































































































































In a way similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we re-scale the problem in function of q with
a =
ag
q and ￿ =
￿q














It is straightforward to check that eU
g1 is decreasing and convex in a, and that it is increasing
















































2. By continuity it is still true for lower values of a. When a is very large
so that success is di¢ cult, the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is always higher with up-or-out than with an
internal labor market.
We now prove that for low values of ￿ it exists al (￿) > 37:5 such that ￿￿(a;￿) ￿ 0 if














































37This part of the proof is done in two steps. First we consider the case ￿ = 0 and show that
there exists a unique al (0) > 37:5. Second, we consider the case ￿ > 0. We show that there
is a critical value ￿l such that for all ￿ < ￿l it exists al(￿) > 37:5 so that ￿￿ ￿ 0 if and
only if a ￿ al(￿). To conclude we show that for all ￿ > ￿l we have ￿￿ > 0 for all a ￿ 37:5.
Consider the case ￿ = 0 so that eU
g1 = 2 p





















































= 0 they cross once.
There is a unique al > 37:5 so that ￿￿ ￿ 0 if and only if a ￿ al. We have al s 182:95 for
￿ = 0.
We now turn to the case ￿ > 0. One can check after tedious computations that for











+d(a;￿) is decreasing and convex in a. We can thus apply the same reasoning
as before. Since lim
a!+1￿￿(a;￿) > 0 8￿ 2 [0;5], we just need to show that it exists a
￿l > 0 so that ￿￿(37:5;￿) < 0 8￿ < ￿l. The function ￿￿(37:5;￿) is continuous in ￿.
Moreover ￿￿(37:5;0) < 0 while ￿￿(37:5;5) > 0 so that there is at least one ￿l 2 (0;5] so
that ￿￿(37:5;￿) = 0. The following graph of ￿￿(37:5;￿) shows that ￿l is unique with
￿l s 2:07.
<Figure 1 about here.>
Finally, note that by construction ￿￿(37:5;￿) < 0 for all ￿ < ￿l. Hence, for all ￿ < ￿l
it exists al(￿) > 37:5 so that ￿￿ ￿ 0 if and only if a ￿ al(￿). The following graph shows
that for ￿ > ￿l we have ￿￿ > 0 for all a ￿ 37:5.
<Figure 2 about here.>
QED
38Figure 1
Figure 2University Full Prof.  Assoc. Prof. Ass. Prof.
(Assoc. + Ass. Prof) / Full 
Professor
1 Arizona State 20 6 8 0.7
2 Berkeley 41 4 9 0.3
3 Boston U 21 7 12 0.9
4 Brown 15 5 9 0.9
5 Columbia 33 4 14 0.5
6 Cornell 27 0 7 0.3
7 Dartmouth College 15 5 4 0.6
8 Duke 29 9 10 0.7
9 Georgetown 12 8 6 1.2
10 Harvard 37 3 11 0.4
11 Indiana 12 8 1 0.8
12 Iowa State 26 11 3 0.5
13 Johns Hopkins 13 1 3 0.3
14 Michigan State 27 13 7 0.7
15 MIT 31 3 6 0.3
16 NYU 34 4 14 0.5
17 Northwestern 23 5 13 0.8
18 Ohio State 25 8 8 0.6
19 Penn State 18 4 4 0.4
20 Princeton 45 0 11 0.2
21 Purdue 9 4 7 1.2
22 Rice 14 3 4 0.5
23 Rutgers 22 6 3 0.4
24 Stanford 34 6 17 0.7
25 Syracuse 17 4 7 0.6
26 U of Arizona 11 5 4 0.8
27 U CA, Irvine 8 6 11 2.1
28 U CA, Santa Barbara 15 1 6 0.5
29 UCLA 24 8 12 0.8
30 U California - San Diego 25 7 17 1
31 U Florida 14 3 2 0.4
32 U Illinois 16 2 7 0.6
33 U Iowa 12 3 5 0.7
34 U Minnesota 18 3 7 0.6
35 U North Carolina 8 6 9 1.9
36 U Pennsylvania 17 3 11 0.8
37 U Pittsburgh 13 4 8 0.9
38 U Rochester 8 3 11 1.8
39 U Southern California 14 4 3 0.5
40 U Texas - Austin 16 6 12 1.1
41 U Virginia 16 4 14 1.1
42 U Washington 14 5 6 0.8
43 U WI-Madison 15 3 9 0.8
44 U of Chicago 26 0 5 0.2
45 U of Maryland 16 7 11 1.1
46 U of Oregon 12 3 4 0.6
47 Utah 13 6 5 0.8
48 Vanderbilt U 19 6 6 0.6
49 Washington U St Louis 23 5 5 0.4
50 Yale 37 2 12 0.4
Mean 20.2 4.72 8 0.7
Table 1: Junior / senior ratios, top 50 U.S. economic departments
Sources: University homepages (June 2009). The 50 top U.S. econ. dept's are listed according to Dusansky and Vernon 
(1998). Information for Michigan, UC-Davis, Cal Tech, Texas A&M, Boston College, Carnegie Mellon, Virginia Tech, 
Colorado, Houston, N. Carolina State, SUNY-Albany was not available. We used the next-highest ranked departments.  University # Researchers
Share Prof.    (A 
rank)
Share "Non-Prof."            
(B rank)
B rank/ A rank
1 Toulouse TSE 125 52 48 0.9
2 PSE-Paris 1 214 46 54 1.2
3 Crest-ENSAE 67 83 17 0.2
4 HEC
5 AIX Marseille 114 47 53 1.1
6 Ecole Polytechnique 33 66 34 0.5
7 Cergy Pontoise 37 28 72 2.5
8 IEP Paris 9 65 35 0.5
9 Nancy 2 Strasbourg 95 32 68 2.1
10 Paris 9 124 36 64 1.8
11 Caen-Rennes 121 34 66 2
12 Paris 10 80 30 70 2.4
13 Montpellier 1 - INRA 62 31 69 2.3
14 Le Mans 18 40 60 1.5
15 Paris 2 41 56 44 0.8
16 Clermont 1 32 27 73 2.8
17 Lille 1 Polytech Lille 153 28 72 2.6
18 Bordeaux 4 72 34 66 2
19 Grenoble 2 - INRA 128 32 68 2.1
20 Lyon 2 70 33 67 2
21 ENS Cachan 7 46 55 1.2
22 INRA Vers-Grig 12 46 54 1.2
23 INRA Ivry 37 34 66 2
24 Nantes  23 24 76 3
25 Evry 18 47 53 1.1
26 INRA Dijon 11 36 64 1.7
27 Montpellier 3 10 5 95 18
28 Besancon 24 33 67 2
29 Lille 3 11 14 86 6.3
30 INRA Rennes 12 42 58 1.4
31 Reims 32 11 89 8
32 Lille 2 13 27 73 2.7
33 Cired 14 37 63 1.7
34 Perpignan 12 9 91 10.5
35 Cnam 7 57 43 0.8
36 Nice 83 42 58 1.4
37 Orleans 34 37 63 1.7
38 Strasbourg 3 13 34 66 2
39 Paris 13 45 43 57 1.3
40 Toulon 11 27 73 2.7
41 St Etienne 22 23 77 3.4
42 Marne La Vallee 11 29 71 2.5
43 Tours - - - -
44 Versailles 24 29 71 2.4
45 Angers 18 33 67 2
46 Dijon 65 29 71 2.4
47 Antilles Guyane 22 37 63 1.7
48 La Reunion 19 11 90 8.5
49 Brest 21 12 88 7.2
50 Limoges 18 22 78 3.5
Mean 46.75 34.8 65.2 2.8
Table 2: Junior / senior ratios, top 50 economic departments, France
 not applicable because business schools have no B rank
Source: Bosquet et al (2010). Rank A are senior professors. Universities and other research institutions usually operate 
joint research facilities in a given city. In some cities there are more than one of these facilities. Departments are listed by 
rank, as we also look into the ratios for the top 20 departments. 